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Abstract 
This research provides new estimates of illicit capital flight from Saudi Arabia using the Residual methodology and 
accounts for the social opportunity cost of those unregulated funds in terms of forgone economic growth by utilizing the 
Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR) approach. The empirical findings reveal that over the period 1971-2015, 
capital flight from Saudi Arabia reached over 212 billion of 2010 USD, causing an annual average of 3.57 percent of 
wasted potential additional economic growth for the same period. When considering the median instead, an incremental 
1.72 percent would have been added annually to the aggregate output growth in Saudi Arabia had capital flight not 
taken place with the observed pattern during the analysis period. The research concludes with important suggestions for 
extending this work and crucial remarks for policymakers to tackle unregulated cross-border capital flows and minimize 
the related consequences. Critical policy measures include coordination with trading partners and key investment 
destination for Saudi capital flows, as well as strengthening of the regulatory framework for cross-border financial 
transactions based on best international practices.  
Keywords: capital flight, economic growth, Saudi Arabia, ICOR, the Residual approach 
1. Introduction 
The issue of capital flight from developing countries has received renewed attention of scholars and international 
organizations. While economic theory suggests the direction of capital flows should be from the rich (capital abundant) 
developed countries to the less developed (capital scarce) countries, new empirical studies have proved otherwise. 
Indeed, many developing and less-developed countries have been found to be net creditors to the world through 
unregulated capital flows ( e.g., see Epstein 2005; Boyce and Ndikumana, 2000, 2010, and Almounsor, 2005, 2008). 
While facing financing constraints, many developing countries continue to leak financial resources in the form of illicit 
and unregulated capital flows to the rest of the world. Considered as dissaving, capital flight reduces the stock of 
financial resources available for productive domestic investment and spending, thereby undermining capacity for 
economic growth and development. Many scholars have also attributed sluggish economic growth and persistent 
balance of payments deficits in developing countries to capital flight (Onwidoduokit, 2001). In addition, capital flight 
can destabilize the domestic interest rate and exchange rate, which weakens the effect of financial policies (Cuddington, 
1986, and Pastor, 1990).  
Capital flight also undermines good governance, fosters corruption, contributes to uncertainty and instability, and 
reduces capacity for provision of public services. In addition, the loss of capital flows can erode the domestic tax base 
and widen income and social inequality by redistributing income from the poor to the rich (Pastor, 1990; Ajayi, 1997). 
The concealment of such cross border financial flows is in itself a concern for developing countries because it signals a 
great deal of underlying problems that need long term treatment.  
This research provides new and extended estimates of capital flight from Saudi Arabia and assesses the potential impact 
of capital flight on socioeconomic conditions. In particular, the research simulates the impact of capital flight on 
economic growth, using the Financing Gap Approach based on the well-known Harrod-Domar Model. As such, the 
calibration shows how much income per capita would have been generated if all the illicit funds transferred abroad were 
geared toward domestic investment, assuming the same productivity of actual investment. 
There are three major contributions of this research to the literature. First, it sheds light on the issue of capital flight as a 
serious and often overlooked problem in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC). Second, it 
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provides new calculation of capital flight from Saudi Arabia over an extended period of time not found earlier in the 
literature. Third, the research provides the first calibration of the opportunity cost of capital flight in Saudi Arabia in 
terms of forgone output. 
The results of this work suggest that the Saudi economy has experienced large amounts of capital flight in the last four 
decades. In addition, the findings indicate that capital flight has non-trivial and negative consequences on the long-term 
economic performance of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, important policy measures must be taken to curtail or prevent 
capital flight from Saudi Arabia and therefore help keep necessary resources within the domestic economy.  
This research proceeds in the following way: section 2 reviews the literature on capital flight and its connection to 
economic growth; section 3 provides the methodologies of estimating unregulated capital flows and simulating the 
impact on economic growth; in section 4 the empirical findings are discussed and analyzed; the last section concludes 
with important remarks, future research suggestions, and policy implications.  
2. Literature Review on Capital Flight and Its Implications 
Capital flight is defined here as the transfer of assets abroad in order to reduce loss of principal, loss of return, or loss of 
control over one’s financial wealth due to government-sanctioned activities (Epstein, 2005). As such, capital flight 
consists of international capital flows that try to escape the control of domestic authorities. For developing countries in 
general, several research papers have estimated and analyzed capital flight in different settings (e.g. Boyce and 
Ndikumana 2000, 2010, Epstein 2005; and Nkurunziza 2014). For Saudi Arabia, only two previous studies by the same 
author (Almounsor 2005; 2008) have provided estimates of capital flight and drawn some policy implications in the 
context of the resource-based Middle Eastern economies.  
In Almounsor 2005, capital flight in Saudi Arabia were estimated at 11.8 billion of 1995 USD, over the analysis period 
1971 – 2001. For the resource-based economies of the MENA region as a whole, capital flight amounted to 273 billion 
of 1995 USD, averaging 9.4 percent of GDP on an annual basis. According to Almounsor (2008), Capital flight in the 
oil-based economies is fueled mainly by the proceeds of oil exports in foreign exchange, the single most important 
source of capital inflows in those countries. As such, the largest amounts of capital flight were indeed during the times 
when those countries enjoyed unprecedented amounts of crude oil exports in foreign exchange. In particular, the decade 
of the 1970s and into the early 1980s accounts for most capital outflows from the resource-based economies of the 
MENA region. 
Almounsor (2008) recommends that the resource-based economies undertake appropriate measures to control capital 
flight and pave the way for capital flight reversal. Such reversal of capital would help finance industrialization and 
public development projects that create employment opportunities and enhance productive capacity. As suggested by 
the empirical analysis in Almounsor (2008), the oil-based countries of the sample can reduce capital flight by 
facilitating domestic investment opportunities that would stimulate economic growth and provide an incentive for 
capital to remain within the boundaries. In addition, economic diversification away from the reliance on the industrial 
sector and oil exports would help reduce capital flight significantly in those economies.  
Beja (2007) provided estimates of capital flight from the Philippines from 1970 to 1999 of about 95 billion USD. Using 
the Residual Method and the ICOR approach, the results of this work suggests that the Philippines had lost between 
$ 432 million to $864 million of output, or an average loss in growth rate of 1 to 2.3 percent. As such, the author argues 
if the capital flight were used to finance productive domestic endeavors, the country would have realized stronger 
macroeconomic performance over the three decades of analysis. The author concludes that unless decisive policy 
actions are taken up to address the enduring capital flight, the Philippines would remain caught in the perpetuity of 
crises and would remain frustrated from realizing an economic takeoff.  
Ajayi (2012) provides an analysis of capital flight and its impact on domestic investment and growth in Nigeria, using 
Cointegration and Error Correction Modelling. The findings indicate that capital flight has a negative impact on the 
Nigerian economy. Accordingly, the author recommends fiscal discipline and serious commitment on the part of 
government. In addition, the author suggests the government should provide enabling environment for business to thrive 
and encourage foreign direct investment to Nigeria. 
Adetiloye, Kehinde (2012) undertake an empirical investigation of capital flight in Nigeria using variables of 
investment, exchange rates and others, using vector error correction mechanism and OLS regression analysis. The 
results indicate that capital flight has a negative but insignificant impact on domestic investment in Nigeria.  
Olugbenga and Alamu (2013) present a critical examination of the impact of capital flight on Nigeria's economic growth 
over a period of 30 years (1981-2010), using the Johansen co-integration test. The Results show that there is a long run 
co-integration among the variables. In addition, capital flight has negative impact on economic growth only in the short 
run. However, the authors argue that capital flight significantly and positively influence Nigerian economic growth in 
the long run. According to the authors, this is justified by the importation of capital/industrial goods which when used 
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translates into economic growth. 
Salandy and Henry (2013) examine the impact of capital flight on investment and economic growth in Trinidad and 
Tobago over the period 1971-2008. In this work they provide an empirical investigation into the causal linkage among 
capital flight, domestic investment and economic growth. The authors use two estimation techniques: the Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) Model and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The results point to a negative relationship 
between capital flight and domestic investment and between capital flight and economic growth. The authors argue that 
policy aimed at reducing capital flight can have a positive effect on domestic investment and therefore lead to increased 
levels of economic growth in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Nidukumana (2013) examines the implications of capital flight and tax havens for economic development in 39 African 
countries over 1970-2010. In particular, the paper analyzes empirically the consequences of capital flight on domestic 
investment and the opportunity cost of capital flight in terms of forgone growth. The empirical results indicate that 
capital flight had a negative effect on domestic investment in a statistically significant way. As such, capital flight is 
found to be one of the factors that have contributed to the chronically low domestic investment in African countries over 
the past decades.  
The simulation results based on the Financing Gap Model in Nidukumana (2013) indicate that investing capital flight 
domestically in the 39 African countries would have yielded an extra 2.4 percent annual growth rate on average and a 
median incremental annual GDP growth of 0.8 percent. The author then outlines a strategy to combat capital flight 
including the following: deterring illegal export of honestly acquired capital, addressing trade-related capital flight and 
tax evasion, tackling the revolving door and odious debt, and enforcing banking transparency and tax compliance in 
safe havens. 
Wujung and Mbella (2013) investigate the relationship between capital flight and economic development in the 
Cameroon economy during the period 1970-2013. Applying the Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) technique, the 
authors present evidence in support of a negative significant relationship between capital flight and economic 
development in Cameroon over the period of the study. 
Nkurunziza (2014) has attempted to quantify the magnitude of the effect of capital flight on the rate of poverty 
reduction for 35 African countries, using the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) and the capital stock-based 
method. The results of this work suggest that, on average, if capital flight were invested with the same efficiency as 
domestic investment, it would have helped reduce poverty by an additional 1.9 and 2.5 percent between 1999-2010. As 
such, the author contents that capital flight has significantly undermined the African countries' efforts to reduce poverty 
effectively. 
Weeks (2014) assesses the impact of capital flight on growth in thirty-one sub-Saharan African countries. The analysis 
in this work fails to support the hypothesis that countries with sound fundamentals experience low capital flight. This 
research also develops a growth estimating equation derived from the Harrod-Domar framework. The growth 
estimations support the conclusion that capital flight had a major negative impact on growth over the last three decades, 
1980–2010. The negative impact was greatest for the petroleum-exporting countries and those affected by internal 
conflict, but it was also substantial for the other countries, with a few exceptions. 
Mpenya, Metseyem, and Ngah Epo (2015) estimate capital flight from natural resources (oil and wood) in the 
Cameroon and simulate the impact of capital flight on economic growth. They also estimate the potential growth 
achieved if capital flight were invested in the local economy, using the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR). The 
results indicate that the natural resources sector is a major source of capital flight in the Cameroon. In addition, if 
capital flight from the natural resource sector were reinvested domestically it would have generated, on average, 0.69 
percentage of additional growth during 1995-2001 and about 0.76 percentage during 2002-2010.  
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Methodology of Estimating Capital Flight 
The Residual Approach developed by the World Bank in 1985 is used here to estimate capital flight from Saudi Arabia. 
According to this approach, capital flight is defined as the difference between recorded capital inflows and recorded 
foreign exchange outflows (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2000). The rationale behind such characterization lies in the 
argument based on the balance of payments identity that capital inflows are either used to finance current account 
deficits or accumulated in the central bank as foreign exchange reserves. Accordingly, capital inflows flows that do not 
go to either account are regarded as capital flight, which finances private external assets. 
More specifically, a surplus of inflows over reported uses reflects capital flight. The residual here captures unrecorded 
flows and usually implies attempts to avoid rules, regulations and social control by local governments (Almounsor 
2005). The starting point of estimating capital flight and thus private external assets is the balance of payments statistics 
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of Saudi Arabia. To carry out the estimation, the Residual Measure is applied as follows: 
KFt =∆ DEBTt + NFIt – (CAt+ ∆ RESt)               (1) 
Where KFt refers to capital flight in current USD for Saudi Arabia in time period t; ∆ DEBT refers to change in total 
external debt stock; NFIt refers to net inflows of foreign investment; CAt refers to the current account deficit; and ∆ 
RESt refers to the changes in the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (net additions).  
Equation (1) calculates unrecorded net outflows of capital from Saudi Arabia. The use of unrecorded flows captures the 
notion that, by this definition, capital flight involves the attempt by wealth holders to avoid government policies. 
However, there might also be cases where wealth holders are motivated by the desire to avoid the control of domestic 
authorities and send funds abroad through recorded channels. As such, capital flight will consist of recorded and 
unrecorded outflows. This paper, however, calculates capital flight using only unrecorded outflows. Therefore, it is 
important to highlight that this measure, based on unrecorded capital flows, is a minimum estimate of capital flight and 
should be considered a floor on the likely degree of unofficially departed financial outflows. 
The capital inflows in equation (1) are (the change in total external debt stock plus net inflows of foreign investment), 
whereas the recorded foreign exchange outflows are (financing the current account deficit and accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves in the central bank). If the difference is positive, this reflects capital flight; if it becomes negative, 
this implies net unrecorded capital inflows into the Saudi economy. Since there is no external debt data for Saudi for the 
period of analysis (1971-2015), the first term of equation 1 (∆DEBT) is disregarded.  
However, the literature on capital flight has identified an important issue to be tackled in the calculation, which is 
trade-misreporting (misinvoicing). Misreporting the export and import transaction (for different motives) distorts the 
current account figures. For example, if the current account deficit is overstated (i.e., import over-invoicing or export 
under-invoicing), the capital flight estimates will be smaller in equation 1. Conversely, if the current account deficit is 
understated (i.e., import under-invoicing or export over-invoicing), the capital flight estimates will be higher in equation 
1. To correct for trade misinvoicing in BOP data, a comparison is performed between Saudi export-import data and 
those of Saudi trading industrial partners, using the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database of the World 
Bank, and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority's data on foreign trade. 
The assumption in the comparison exercise is that the data from industrialized countries trading partners are relatively 
more accurate, and the discrepancy between them and the Saudi trade data is interpreted as evidence of trade 
misinvoicing. For Saudi Arabia, in year, t, export and import discrepancies with industrial partners (North American and 
the European Union countries) are computed as follows: 
DEXPt =PEXPt – (1+CIFt)*EXP t)              (2) 
DIMPt =IMPt – (1+CIFt)* PIMP t)            (3) 
MISINVt = (DEXP/ICXS) + (DIMP/ICMS)         (4) 
Where DEXP and DIMP refer to export and import discrepancies; PEXP and PIMP refer to exports and imports of 
Saudi Arabia recorded in industrial countries’ official statistics; EXP and IMP are exports and imports of Saudi Arabia 
as reported in its own statistics; CIF refers to the cost of freight and insurance; and ICXS and ICMS refer to the share of 
Saudi Arabia's exports to industrial countries in total exports to the world and the share of Saudi imports from industrial 
countries in total imports from the world, respectively.  
The cost of freight and insurance are standardized to 10 percent of the value of exports or imports throughout the 
computation. MISINV refers to global trade misinvoicing of Saudi Arabia. A positive sign of DEXP indicates net export 
under-invoicing; a negative sign indicates net export over-invoicing. Similarly, a positive sign of DIMP indicates net 
import over-invoicing; a negative sign indicates net import underinvoicing. 
Thus, the trade data is corrected for Saudi Arabia and total trade misinvoicing is then added to the calculation of capital 
flight in equation (1) as follows: 
KFAdj t = KFt + MISINVt             (5) 
Lastly, the  adjustment for inflation is done by transforming capital flight into constant 2010 USD using the US 
Producer Price Index (PPI). The rationale here is that a dollar that fled in, say, 1980, from Saudi Arabia, for instance, is 
worth more than a dollar that fled 20 years later. To make the value of capital flight comparable at different dates, they 
must be adjusted for inflation as follows: 
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Real KFAdjt = KF Adjt / PPIt               (6) 
All the data used are in annual frequency and described in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3.2 Methodology of Calibrating the Social Cost of Capital Flight  
This section outlines the methodology used to quantify the potential effect of capital flight on socioeconomic conditions 
based on the Financing Gap Model following Nkurunziza (2014). The main assumption is that Saudi Arabia has a 
resource gap that needs to be filled in order to grow at higher rates. Investing flight capital could partly fill this gap. For 
a target growth rate, this model determines the financing gap between available and required levels of investment. As 
such, the Financing Gap Model is used to determine the potential growth in GDP that could result from additional 
investment represented by the amount of capital flight. Despite criticisms against this approach, the Financing Gap 
Model is widely used in international financial institutions, planning ministries, and central banks (Nkurunziza, 2014).  
3.2.1 ICOR-Based Simulation 
The Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) is defined as the amount of marginal capital investment needed to 
produce one additional unit of output (Nkurunziza (2014). Over a specific time period, ICOR is approximated as the 
ratio of average investment to average GDP growth. The ICOR methodology may also be seen as relating a target 
growth rate to a specific ratio of investment to gross domestic product (GDP), adjusting for the productivity of 
investment, as follows 
              𝑔𝑡 =
𝐼𝑡∕𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝜋𝑡
                    (7) 
Where 𝑔t is the growth rate of output, 𝐼t is investment; GDPt is the gross domestic product; πt is the ICOR and 
subscript 𝑡 represent the year , where 𝑡 ∈ (1971,…, 2015). Investment, GDP and the rate of economic growth are known 
and used to compute the ICOR as follows: 
             𝜋𝑡 =
𝐼𝑡∕𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑡
                (8) 
Low ICOR values imply that investment is more efficient: producing one unit of incremental output requires less 
incremental capital investment. Although straightforward, the computation of ICORs is associated with two major 
issues as outlined in Nkurunziza (2014). First, when rates of economic growth are negative, as has been the case for 
several years in many developing countries, the ICOR turns negative. Negative ICORs do not have any economic 
meaning. Hence, the computations relating investment to output in this paper exclude all observations with 
corresponding negative ICORs. Second, high volatility of growth and, to some extent, investment rates, leads to large 
variations in ICORs. In order to help address this issue, rather than basing the analysis on mean or individual ICORs, 
this research uses the median ICOR instead.  
The empirical results discussed later in the paper consider the median ICOR over the period between 2000 and 2015 for 
two main reasons. First, computing a shorter period median reduces the effect of outliers on the results. Second, the 
median for the period 2000-2015 better reflects the current reality than, for example, using observations from the 1970s. 
Therefore, throughout the sample, there is one (median) ICOR used to compute the effect of capital flight on economic 
growth in Saudi Arabia. As such, the median IOCR for the period 2000-2015 is found to be 4.2 percent, and this 
becomes the fixed denominator to compute the additional growth from investing capital flight (equations 8 and 9). 
Using the median ICOR based on historical values to compute the amount of additional output that could be generated 
by investing flight capital implicitly assumes that additional investment would be as productive as past investment. 
Following the calculation of the ICOR, the next step is the computation of the effect of capital flight on economic 
growth. Based on equations (7) and (8), the growth of output attributable to capital flight is: 
            ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 =
𝐾𝐹𝑡
𝜋𝑡
                     (9) 
Where Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃 is additional GDP in real terms in year t and KF is the flow of real capital flight from Saudi Arabia in the 
same year. Therefore, the level of potential GDP incorporating the effect of investing flight capital is: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑗𝑑𝑡 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡                                                                 (10)  
With equation (10), the growth of GDP per capita due to capital flight may be computed as: 
         ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑡 =  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑡−𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡   
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
                               (11) 
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On the basis of equation (11), the average annual relative difference in income per capita due to the investment of flight 
capital is: 
𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃 =  
1
𝑛
 (∑  ( 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡
𝑛
𝑡
 − 1)   ∗ 100 )                                                 (12) 
The potential impact of capital flight on the rate of economic growth is computed by considering the period between 
1971 and 2015. Hence, the year 1971 is the initial time or beginning of the period of analysis, and 2015 the end of the 
period, so n=43. 
The data used in the computation of this part are annual data and described in the Table A1 in the Appendix. 
4. Discussion and Analysis of Findings 
The results of estimating capital flight from Saudi Arabia are provided in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1. As shown 
there, the Saudi economy has experienced a total of 212.6 billion USD of capital flight between 1971-2015. Indeed, 
some of the annual estimates provided is striking reaching 40 percent of GDP in 1974 and 50, 39 percent of GDP during 
1980, 1981, respectively. Those amounts of money represent deep losses of output, forgone domestic investment, and 
wasted employment opportunities for the Saudi economy. 
 
 
Figure 1. Real Capital Flight from Saudi Arabia in 2010 USD, 1971-2015 
A closer look into the details reveals that 405.3 billion of real USD had fled Saudi Arabia in the decade of 1971-1980 
alone, suggesting a 'lost decade' indeed for the Saudi economy. If capital flight were invested in the local economy 
during that decade, it would have generated an extra 5.3 percent of economic growth, on average (Table 2). When 
considering the median instead, potential lost economic growth becomes 4.98 percent for that decade. The capital flight 
estimates by decade in Table 2 suggest that most illicit capital outflows took place during the period 1971-1980.  
The following two decades (1981-1990, 1991-2000) exhibit rather an opposite direction of illicit capital flows, implying 
the entrance of large amounts of unregulated foreign exchange into the Saudi economy. This is usually related to trade 
tax evasion, smuggling activities, and perhaps money laundering, which also need the careful attention of policymakers. 
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Table 1. New Estimates of Capital flight from Saudi Arabia, 1971-2015 
Real KF in 
Percentage of 
Real GDP 
Real Capital 
Flight (KF)  
in Million 
2010 USD  
Year  Real KF in 
Percentage of 
Real GDP 
Real Capital 
Flight (KF)  
in Million 
2010 USD 
Year 
13- 38,877- 1999  2 1,881 1971 
4 13,138  2000  4 4,506 1972 
3 10,239  2001  7 10,069 1973 
7- 21,514- 2002  40 74,645 1974 
14 49,660  2003  22 42,001 1975 
20 77,251  2004  29 61,594 1976 
1 2,232  2005  21 47,343 1977 
3 14,994  2006  2 4,406 1978 
7- 32,081- 2007  12 28,699 1979 
10- 49,463- 2008  50 130,157 1980 
4 20,215  2009  39 106,935 1981 
3- 16,150- 2010  8 18,716 1982 
1 4,198  2011  22- 50,014- 1983 
2- 12,885- 2012  28- 61,960- 1984 
1- 3,998- 2013  18- 36,889- 1985 
7 46,840  2014  7- 15,326- 1986 
7 43,890  2015  14- 30,207- 1987 
    6- 14,353- 1988 
 
212,613 
Total Real 
KF 
 
3- 5,731- 1989 
    2 4,142 1990 
1.86%  Overall 
Average 
 
18- 47,554- 1991 
    3- 9,557- 1992 
    17- 47,732- 1993 
     7- 21,107- 1994 
    6- 15,703- 1995 
    6- 16,612- 1996 
    4- 10,736- 1997 
    15- 46,686- 1998 
 
Table 2. Potential Additional Growth form Investing Capital Flight in Saudi Arabia, 1971-2015 
Additional  
GDP 
Growth  
 %(( Median 
Additional GDP 
Growth  
Rate 
(% Average) 
Actual  
GDP 
Growth 
Rate  
(Average) 
Potential 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Actual GDP Per  
Capita 
In 2010 USD 
Real KF As %  
GDP 
(Average) 
Year  
4.98% 5.3% 11.78% 25,532 24,364 19 % 1971-1980 
4.84 4.8% -0.46% 21,901 17,346 -5 % 1981-1990 
0.98% 0.98% 2.76% 15,125 15,288 -8% 1991-2000 
2.12% 2.3% 5.14% 16,450 16,589 2 % 2001-2010 
1.55% 1.15% 5.03% 21,064 20,783 2 % 2011-2015 
1.72% 3.57% 4,83% 21,654 18,662 1.86% Overall Average 
/Median 
The capital flight estimates for the last period of analysis (2001-2015) show a reversal of direction pointing to 
unregulated capital outflows once again. During 2001-2015 alone, the Saudi economy experienced more than 146.5 
billion of capital flight in real USD, averaging 2 percent of real GDP. This period is rather more complex in terms of 
economic performance and important economic events. In 2005-2006, the Saudi stock market sharply crashed, while 
during 2007-08 the global economy slipped into the so-called 'global financial crisis'. In addition, the 'global sovereign 
debt crisis' emerged in 2010-12. All these events may have been important factors influencing the pattern of capital 
flight during that period. However, the extent of the impact of such important economic events on Saudi capital flight is 
an empirical question beyond the scope of this paper. 
In terms of forgone output, the Saudi economy lost about 3.5 percent of potential additional growth, on average, during 
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2001-2015 because of capital flight. Between 2001-2010, more than 68.5 billion USD (2 percent of GDP) has illicitly 
departed Saudi Arabia, wasting a chance to grow by an additional 2.3 percent, on average. During 2011-2015, yet 
another 2 percent of GDP of capital flight (78 billion USD) left the economy sacrificing investment opportunities and 
potential average growth of 1.15 percent.  
The overall counterfactual simulations reveal that the period of analysis (1971-2015) has witnessed substantial amounts 
of capital flight that caused the economy to miss about 3.57 percent of average output growth, or a median of 1.72 
percent of lost potential growth. In fact, as presented in Table 2, if the departed funds were geared domestically for 
productive investment opportunities, real GDP per capita would have become 21,654 (potential) for the same period, 
instead of 18,662 (actual). The potential total economic growth for the Saudi economy would have been 8.4 percent, 
instead of the actual average of 4.8 percent had capital flight not taken place as observed. These findings confirm that 
capital flight has indeed undermined long-term economic performance in Saudi Arabia. 
Table 3 presents the estimates of capital flight based on equation 1 instead of equation 5, taking out the effect of trade 
misinvoicing. Strikingly, the capital flight calculation based on equation 5 is undermined significantly by the amounts 
of trade misinvoicing. The calculation of misreporting of trade transactions reveal a striking result; massive export 
overinvoicing and relatively less amount of import underinvoicing. 
When disregarding the trade misreporting, total real capital flight for the whole period mounts to 725.7 billion USD, 
with the last period alone (2000-2015) registering 569 billion USD. Total trade misreporting as shown in Table 3 
mounts to more than (– 513) billion USD during 1971-2015, suggesting unregulated capital inflows entering the country 
through trade activities. Although the trading partners' data are available only since 1991, those illegitimate trade 
practices have intensified since the year 2002 onwards. While capital flight is a drain of the country's resources, trade 
misreporting in this context indicates illegal cross border capital inflows connected to smuggling, tax evasion activities, 
and perhaps money laundering, and this requires the immediate attention and prompt action of policymakers. 
Table 3. Capital Flight (Excluding Trade Misreporting) & Potential Growth, 1971-2015 
Additional  
GDP 
Growth % 
(Median 
Additional 
GDP 
Growth  
Rate 
(% Average) 
Actual  
GDP 
Growth 
Rate  
(Average) 
Trade Misreporting 
 
(Billions of 2010 
USD) 
Real KF 
As % 
GDP 
(Average) 
Year  
4.98% 5.3% 11.78% NA 19% 1971-1980 
4.84% 4.8% -0.46% NA -5% 1981-1990 
2.24% 2.24% 2.76% 107.3 -5% 1991-2000 
2.68% 3% 5.14% 173.4 6% 2001-2010 
2.5% 2.6% 5.03% 232.3 7% 2011-2015 
 
2.8% 
 
4.06% 
 
4,83% 
 
513.2 
 
4% 
Overall Average 
/Median 
The capital flight estimates based on equation 1 in Table 3 suggest that potential output growth is even higher when 
removing the contribution of trade misreporting. Overall, if the 725.7 billion USD of flight capital remained within the 
Saudi economy and invested with the same productivity as local investment, an average of 4.06 % growth would have 
been achieved in addition to the actual growth (4.8 %). As such overall output growth for the Saudi economy in this 
case would have been about 8.9 percent for the period 1971-2015, instead of the actual 4.8 percent. 
5. Conclusion 
Contemporary economic research has underscored the significance and consequences of capital flight from developing 
countries. Most importantly, the growth-generating investment capacity is significantly undermined by the illicit 
transfer of funds abroad. While the intention of capital flights is to finance external private assets, this drain of domestic 
resources represents forgone economic growth opportunities that would have been realized in the domestic economy. 
Besides that, capital flight is linked to many other problems such as corruption, tax evasion, weak governance, and 
social inequality, to name a few. 
This research has estimated capital flight from Saudi Arabia over the last four decades and provided a calibration of its 
social opportunity cost. The large amounts of discovered illicit capital flows is indeed alarming and requires prompt 
regulation and control of domestic authorities. Had those funds been available locally, the Saudi economy would have 
realized much higher growth rates and would have achieved higher industrial status among developing countries. 
Important policy measures need to be put in place to address illicit capital flight and the associated problems. This 
requires coordination with trading partners and key investment destination for Saudi capital flows. In addition, the 
regulatory framework for cross-border financial transactions need to be strengthened and built on best international 
practices. Combating capital flight would enable a faster growth of capital accumulation thereby sustaining domestic 
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productive investment and enhancing balanced economic growth opportunities that promote social and income equality. 
Such efforts have also the chance of controlling corruption and improving transparency of cross border transactions that 
have national security considerations and may help pave the way for capital flight reversal to Saudi Arabia.    
Important extension of this research would be an econometric analysis of the causes of capital flight (push factors) from 
Saudi Arabia using the provided estimates in this research. In addition, an analysis of the 'pull factors' of capital flight in 
the global economic environment would be a valuable contribution to demystifying the dynamics of capital flight in 
Saudi Arabia. As such, key underlying forces driving the behavior of capital flight would need to be outlined and 
discussed for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon. 
Some of the other important policy suggestions regarding the control of unregulated capital flows as outlined in Kar and 
Spanjers (2014) are particularly relevant in this context. Financial regulators should require that all banks in their 
country know the true beneficial owners of any accounts opened in their financial institutions. In addition, regulators 
and law enforcement should ensure that all of the anti-money laundering regulations are strongly enforced. 
Policymakers should require public disclosure by multinational companies and should engage in automatic exchange of 
tax information with trading partners and investment destinations. Lastly, relevant authorities are also strongly 
recommended to intensify scrutiny of trade transactions and boost customs enforcement to limit trade misreporting and 
smuggling of traded goods.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Data description 
Source of Data Variable 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Net Capital  Inflows (NFI) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Current Account Balance (CA) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Change in Reserves (Res) 
OECD Database US Producers' Price Index (PPI)  
Authors' Calculations from WDI & OECD Database Real Capital Flight (KF) 
Authors' Calculations from WDI & OECD Database  Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) 
World Trade Integrated Solutions (World Bank) PEXP 
World Trade Integrated Solutions (WITS)- (World Bank) PIMP 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority's database EXP 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority's database IMP 
Author's calculation from WITS Database ICXS 
Author's calculation from WITS Database ICMS 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Growth Rate (g) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Investment (I) – Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Population  
World Development Indicators (WDI) GDP per capita  
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